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STANDARDS OF REVIEW - LOOKING
BEYOND THE LABELS
RONALD R. HOFER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the concept of standards of review has come to the fore
in appellate circles, often bewildering law students and occasional appellate
practitioners. Standards of review prove difficult in both theory and prac-
tice. They are not susceptible of easy definition, and few guidelines assist
the bench and bar with the practical problem of getting from a particular
appellate' issue to the appropriate standard of review.
This article endeavors to cast some light upon the three conventional
kinds of appellate questions, namely fact, law, and discretion. By doing so,
it will provide some benchmarks designed to assist in assigning a particular
standard of review to a particular issue.
Finally, this article advocates that appellate courts reject their long-
standing reliance upon the three conventional labels in favor of an analysis
which affords deference to lower tribunals where they were in a better posi-
tion to address a question than the appellate court would be. Appellate
opinions should acknowledge not only the degree of deference afforded to
particular questions, but also the reasons for that deference or lack of it.
The bench and bar alike will benefit when opinions employing standards of
review explain not only the "what," but the "why" as well.
* District Staff Attorney, District II, Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Adjunct Assistant Profes-
sor of Law, Marquette University Law School. H.B.A., 1972, Marquette University; M.A., 1973,
University of Virginia; J.D., 1981, Marquette University. The opinions expressed in this article
are those of the author and do not represent the opinions of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals or
the Marquette University Law School.
1. The primary focus of this article is upon appellate court review. What theory it contains is
applicable to more than just Wisconsin; nevertheless, this article focuses upon Wisconsin law in
order to avoid addressing the varying degrees and nuances of deference used in other jurisdictions.
See generally, eg., Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 DEF. L.J. 377 (1984); Childress,
Standards of Review in Eleventh Circuit Civil Appeals, 9 NOVA L.J. 257 (1985).
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II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Definitions
A standard of review is "a limiting mechanism which defines an appel-
late court's scope of review,"2 and hence its power.3 However, standard of
review is far easier to describe than to define. Metaphorically, it sets the
height of the hurdles over which an appellant must leap in order to prevail
on appeal. One commentator adopts a different metaphor: "[Standards of
review] indicate the decibel level at which the appellate advocate play to
catch the judicial ear."' On a more literal level, standards of review are
measures of the degree of deference that appellate courts must pay to lower
tribunals, most notably trial courts. In so allocating deference, these stan-
dards define the allocation of power between the trial and appellate courts.5
Perhaps standards of review are more easily understood by reference to
a pointedly narrow and decidedly nontechnical description of the trial and
appellate processes. In the course of a trial, a trial judge makes a variety of
intermediate rulings. Ultimately, he or she, with or without a jury, resolves
the case in some fashion. A disappointed party may then come to an appel-
late court and urge that court to overthrow the trial court's final judgment
or order by raising issues which argue that one or more of the trial court's
determinations,6 either intermediate or ultimate, were erroneous.
The appellate court, bound as it is to the record on appeal,7 and without
benefit of live witnesses or the like, does not review all issues similarly. On
some issues, the appellate court defers in large or small measure to the trial
court's determination. On others, it pays no deference. Obviously, the
more an appellate court defers on an issue, the more difficult it will be for
an appellant to prevail. In this process, standards of review identify how
much deference is paid to each kind of issue. The wise appellant who
knows and states the standard of review for an issue also knows the relative
difficulty of the task before him or her. The careful intermediate appellate
2. Brennan, supra note 1, at 379.
3. Brennan, supra note 1, at 377. Brennan's article provides an excellent overview of stan-
dards of review. For a Wisconsin-oriented approach, see Gartzke, Standards of Appellate Review,
in APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN WISCONSIN app. D (D. WALTHER, P. GROVE &
M. HEFFERNAN ed. 1986).
4. Rubin, The Admiralty Case on Appeal in the Fifth Circuit, 43 LA. L. REV. 869, 873 (1983).
5. See Childress, supra note 1, at 263.
6. Throughout this article, I will use the generic term "determination" to embrace any sort of
trial court pronouncement which serves as the gravamen for an issue on appeal.
7. See Schimke v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 317, 320, 149 N.W.2d 659,
661 (1967).
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court that knows and uses the standard of review lessens its own chances of
error or reversal.
B. Types
Standards of review classically include two elements: An identification
of the type of issue, and the measure of deference paid to that issue. Subject
to some hybrids and exceptions, the oft-quoted trichotomy proposed by
Professor Rosenberg is still helpful: "[A]ll appellate Gaul is divided into
three parts for review purposes: questions of fact, of law and of discre-
tion."' The basic measure of deference for each of these types is well settled
in Wisconsin: Factual findings of the trial court will not be overturned un-
less clearly erroneous.9 "The appellate court may determine questions of
law independently with no deference to the conclusions reached by the trial
court."10 An appellate court will sustain a discretionary decision if "the
trial court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law,
and using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a rea-
sonable judge could reach."'"
C. Problems
Were these the alpha and omega of standards of review, the only practi-
cal problem remaining, albeit a substantial one, would be the identification
of a particular issue as a question of fact, law, or discretion. However, the
appellate waters have been long muddied with various exceptions. For ex-
ample, an appellate court will not defer to a finding of fact if that finding is
8. Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRAcusE L.
REV. 635, 645-46 (1971) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion]; see also Rosenberg, Appel-
late Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173 (1975) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Appellate
Review].
9. Walser Leasing, Inc. v. Simonson, 120 Wis. 2d 458, 461, 355 N.W.2d 545, 546 (Ct. App.
1984). Note that the "clearly erroneous" standard, taken from Wis. STAT. § 805.17(2) (1989-90),
has been held to be essentially the same as the great weight and clear preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. See Noll v. Dimiceli's Inc., 115 Wis. 2d 641, 643-44, 340 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Ct.
App. 1983).
10. In re Marriage of Levy, 130 Wis. 2d 523, 529, 388 N.W.2d 170, 172-73 (1986) (citations
omitted).
11. Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 415, 320 N.W.2d 175, 184 (1982). There are a vari-
ety of formulations of the discretion standard of review. See, e.g., Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis.
2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16, 20-21 (1981); Domain Industries, Inc. v. Thomas, 118 Wis. 2d 99, 103,
345 N.W.2d 516, 518-19 (Ct. App. 1983); Asbeck v. Asbeck, 116 Wis. 2d 289, 294-95, 342
N.W.2d 750, 753 (Ct. App. 1983).
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part of a stipulation12 or otherwise undisputed. 13 Conversely, an appellate
court will defer to the legal conclusion of a lower tribunal where that tribu-
nal has some special expertise respecting a particular body of law. 14 While
there are other exceptions, these exceptions do not roil those waters alone.
Further confusion arises when we consider a hybrid standard, the "mixed
standard." 5
We can see from the above discussion that the determination of the
measure of deference paid to a particular issue is not reducible to the mere
identification of fact, law, or discretion. Now we shall see that getting from
a real world issue to the appropriate measure of deference is at least as
problematic. That is, the "labeling" of an issue, the classifying of it by type,
is not self-evident. Take, for example, a seemingly straightforward appel-
late issue: "Did the trial court err in determining that X was married
before January 1, 1990?" Assume, as background, that X had to have got-
ten married before January 1, 1990 in order to take under his rich uncle's
will. At trial, X's witnesses testified that they were present at the wedding
ceremony on December 31, 1989. Others testified that the ceremony was
on January 1, 1990. The trial court ruled in X's favor, and Y, the rich
uncle's wife, appeals arguing error in the trial court's determination that
her nephew was married on December 31, 1989. Conveniently ignoring
discretion for the moment, is Y's issue one of fact or law? Although intui-
tion might lead one to conclude that, on its face, it is one of fact, the ques-
tion could just as readily be one of law. If Y concedes the legality of the
ceremony but argues that the ceremony actually occurred on January 1,
1990, rather than on December 31, 1989, then the issue is one of fact to
which an appellate court owes considerable deference to the trial court's
findings. If, however, Y concedes that X's witnesses were accurate in their
recollection, but argues that the ceremony was without legal effect in that it
failed to comply with the requisite statute, then the issue is one of law be-
cause "the application of a statute to a particular set of facts is a question of
12. See State v. J. C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 151, 179 N.W.2d 641, 655 (1970).
13. Cf Boutelle v. Chrislaw, 34 Wis. 2d 665, 673, 150 N.W.2d 486, 490 (1967) (the court is
also not bound by a finding based upon undisputed evidence when that finding is essentially a
conclusion of law).
14. See Robert Hansen Trucking, Inc. v. LIRC, 126 Wis. 2d 323, 331, 377 N.W.2d 151, 154-
55 (1985). Note that while this case refers to deference paid to an administrative agency, much
the same process occurs when federal appeals courts defer on legal questions to district courts
experienced in the law of the state in which the district court sits. See, eg., Freeman v. Continen-
tal Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1967); see also Childress, supra note 1, at 276.
15. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
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law."" 6 If Y concedes nothing, two issues are then presented, one of fact
and one of law. This homely example shows that the leap from the issue to
its appropriate standard of review may be far from easy or intuitive.
III. FAcT VERSUS LAW
Leaving discretion aside for a moment, let us examine facts versus law
in an effort to get beyond the mere labels. At first blush, this distinction
might seem self-evident, yet commentators have disputed for decades the
boundaries of each, and noted their "delusive simplicity." 17 Professor Jaffe
saw fact and law as a spectrum, with one shade blending imperceptibly into
the other. 8 Elsewhere, the law is seen as growing downward toward "roots
of fact" which grow upward to meet it.' 9
Although there is undoubted truth in the United States Supreme
Court's statement that "we [do not] yet know of any other rule or principle
that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion,"20
legal scholars have attempted to provide guidelines, at least, toward defin-
ing this distinction. The tendency to divide questions along legal and fac-
tual lines is "very strong."21 Others have defined questions of law as those
that deal with the general body of legal principles; questions of fact deal
with "all other phenomena...." 22 The difference between fact and law has
been characterized as that between "ought" questions and "is" questions, 23
or between policy and empirical questions.24
Still others have employed a result-oriented approach, which may well
be approaching its century mark.2 "[W]hen the courts are unwilling to
review, they are tempted to explain by the easy device of calling the ques-
tion one of 'fact'; and when otherwise disposed, they say it is a question of
'law.' "26 Somewhat related is the school of thought that ascribes the label-
ing process to the appellate courts' "intuitive appreciation of the law/fact
16. Maxey v. Redevelopment Authority, 120 Wis. 2d 13, 18, 353 N.W.2d 812, 815 (Ct. App.
1984), construed in Weiss v. Weiss, 122 Wis. 2d 688, 692, 365 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Ct. App. 1985).
17. Isaacs, The Law and The Facts, 22 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1922); see also Note, The Law!
Fact Distinction and Unsettled State Law in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 157, 175 (1985).
18. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REv. 239, 240 (1955).
19. Paul, Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARV. L. REv.
753, 812 (1944).
20. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
21. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 30.40, at 209 (1958).
22. Isaacs, supra note 17, at 3.
23. See Davis, supra note 21, at 208.
24. Note, supra note 17, at 179.
25. See Fox, Law and Fact, 12 HARV. L. REv. 545, 551 (1898-99).
26. Paul, supra note 19, at 811-12 (quoting DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE
SUPREMACY OF LAW 55 (1927)).
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distinction."27 But upon what is this "intuition" based? Let us examine
how various commentators have defined law and fact.
A. Definitions of "'Fact"
Judges and academics alike have waxed eloquently over definitions of
these most seminal terms. "Nothing is a question of fact which is not a
question of the existence, reality, truth of something; of the rei veritas."28
Professor Thayer further glossed facts as "indicating things, events, actions,
conditions, as happening, existing, really taking place."29 Professor Bohlen
extends the definition beyond the strictly empirical to the subjective as well;
facts include "not only the physical facts of the case but also more abstract
matters, such as the state of mind of those individuals whose state of mind
may be of legal importance."30
About facts, or questions of fact, we can say that they involve the "em-
pirical - revolving around actual events, past or future,"'" that they relate
to "a person's acts, or his intent in doing such acts,"32 that they are "de-
scriptive" rather than "dispositive,"33 and that they call for proof rather
than argument.34 Also, what might appear singularly self-evident is also
worthy of note: A finding of fact is "independent of or anterior to any
assertion as to its legal effect."35
B. Definitions of "Law"
Definitions of "law" are no less plentiful, yet few boil down to more
than "that which is not fact," or "that which involves rules or principles."
Law consists of "those rules and standards of general application by which
the state regulates human affairs." 6 Those rules and standards optimally
should be "generally and uniformly applicable to all persons of like qualities
and status and in like circumstances,"37 and should be "capable of being
predicated in advance and which [being] so predicated, await proof of the
27. Note, supra note 17, at 173.
28. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 191
(1898) (footnotes omitted).
29. Id.
30. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1924).
31. Note, supra note 17, at 179.
32. Cheese v. Industrial Comm'n, 21 Wis. 2d 8, 15, 123 N.W.2d 553, 557 (1963).
33. Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1329 (1942).
34. Id. at 1304.
35. Jaffe, supra note 18, at 241.
36. Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 899, 901 (1943) (footnote
omitted).
37. Id. at 904 (footnote omitted).
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facts necessary for their application."'38 While the principles of law are per-
ceived as existing antecedently to particular facts, the application of those
principles occurs only after the facts have been ascertained.39
A more pragmatic approach to the fact/law dichotomy begins to take us
in an entirely different direction. "The law is what the court knows."'
More descriptive than definitional, this approach, ringing as it does of the
"arguing in a circle" fallacy, at least provides accuracy, if at the expense of
utility: The law is what we are accustomed to leave to courts.41
C. Law and Fact: A Functional Approach
Our discussion of definitions has thus far taken us, it would seem, little
way from a purely intuitive understanding of fact and law. Fact is empiri-
cal, it concerns itself with events occurring either in the real world or in the
mind, and it is the fodder for the application of law. Law, on the other
hand, consists of rules, standards, or principles determined in advance of
their application. These definitions, it is submitted, offer insufficient gui-
dance in determining which is which; case law, while of assistance concern-
ing particular factual circumstances, provides little general assistance.4 2
This definitional approach, which Professor Davis labels the "analytical,
literal, or conceptual ' 43 approach, emphasizes the meanings of "law" and
"fact." One looks at the trial court's questioned determination, and meas-
ures it against one's articulated or intuitional definitions of "law" and
"fact." Once done, the assigned label governs, by and large, the degree of
deference to be afforded.
However, a far more workable approach is what Davis terms the "prac-
tical, functional, pragmatic or policy approach ... which attaches these
labels [of 'fact' and 'law'] only on the basis of weighing the practical reasons
for and against each possible allocation."' Though Davis thought that
these labels might be too "deeply embedded" in legal literature to be elimi-
nated, he believed that "a recognition of the desirability of a change is help-
ful to straight thinking."'"
Here, we begin by asserting that labels of "fact" or "law" are little more
than shorthand for measures of deference. Therefore, to know what is fact
38. Bohlen, supra note 30, at 112.
39. See Paul, supra note 19, at 821.
40. Isaacs, supra note 17, at 4 (footnote omitted).
41. Isaacs, supra note 17, at 12.
42. See Childress, supra note 1, at 275.
43. Davis, supra note 21, at 192.
44. Davis, supra note 21, at 192-93.
45. Davis, supra note 21, at 193.
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or law is to know what is or is not deferred to. By seeing what is or is not
deferred to, we can begin to glean why deference exists. Now other ap-
proaches to the understanding of fact and law become pertinent.
We can begin to understand the "why" of the deference question by
looking at case law. "Findings as to the design, motive and intent with
which men act depend peculiarly upon the credit given to witness by those
who see and hear them."46
The phrase "finding of fact" may be a summary characterization of
complicated factors of varying significance for judgment. Such a
"finding of fact" may be the ultimate judgment on a mass of details
involving not merely an assessment of the trustworthiness of witnesses
but other appropriate inferences that may be drawn from living testi-
mony which elude print.47
This functional or practical approach was addressed directly by the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals in State v. Pepin:48
The rationale behind all appellate review may be fairly characterized
in two extremes: an appellate court will defer in large part to a trial
court's determination where the lower court is in a better position to
make that determination than is the appellate court; conversely, lit-
tle or no deference is accorded where the appellate court is as capa-
ble of determining the question as is the trial court. Questions of
fact are accorded deference because the trial court was present at the
reception of evidence and had an opportunity to view the demeanor
of witnesses and assess their credibility.... Questions of law, on the
other hand, are traditionally accorded little or no deference because
there is nothing intrinsic to their determination which gives the trial
court any advantage over an appellate court.49
As Professor Davis put it, "those who see and hear the witnesses testify are
in a better position to determine some aspects of fact questions than those
who are limited to a cold record . . .,,"
This "better position" analysis is scarcely new;5" yet it is surprisingly
neglected as an analytical tool. Its one central advantage as a test for deter-
mining whether a question is one of fact or law is a kind of practical clarity:
46. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 341, 388 (1949) (emphasis added).
47. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670 (1944) (emphasis added).
48. 110 Wis. 2d 431, 328 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1982).
49. Id. at 435-36, 328 N.W.2d at 900 (citation omitted).
50. Davis, supra note 21, at 208.
51. See, e.g., D. WOTHER, supra note 3; Brennan, supra note 1, at 379; Brown, supra note 36,
at 927.
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If the trial court was in no better postion to determine a question, the appel-
late court need not defer.52
But before we can engage in the application of the better position test,
we must examine three other antecedent concerns. First, why do appellate
courts not defer to trial courts' conclusions of law? Second, in what ways
can a trial court be said to be in a better position to determine a question
than would be an appellate court? Third, can deference depend upon any
factors other than better position?
1. Why Not Defer on Law?
Perhaps no more need, nor can, be said about this than that questions of
law are "traditionally accorded little or no deference because there is noth-
ing intrinsic to their determination which gives the trial court any advan-
tage over an appellate court." 3 By pointing out that a trial court must
have an advantage in order to be deferred to, this statement does make clear
that trial courts must yield to their equally advantaged appellate tribunals.
Yet, for its implicit "tie goes to the appellate court" conclusion, the quoted
statement begs the question of deference in the first instance. Perhaps ap-
pellate superiority on "law" stems from a hierarchical model. Judges,
rather than juries, answer legal questions because they are "better qualified
than the jury to interpret the written language."54 So too, then, are appel-
late judges better qualified than their counterparts on trial bench? Perhaps,
if only by dint of numbers; three (or seven or nine) heads are, so hopes the
law, better than one. As Swift said, "So naturalists observe, a flea/ Hath
smaller fleas that on him prey;/ And these have smaller still to bite 'em/
And so proceed ad infinitum.! Thus every poet, in his kind,/ Is bit by him
that comes behind."55 For "poet," read "trial judge."
2. What Constitutes "Better Position?"
Second, a question with a more serious answer: What constitutes a
"better position?" Here, there are some obvious answers and some less ob-
vious answers. Deference is accorded to determinations founded on the
trial court's viewing of the witnesses and on its reception of evidence. 6
52. The entire question of the degree of deference due to particular questions is beyond the
scope of this essay. This essay engages in the fiction that appellate court deference is a binary
question; either a determination is deferred to or it is not. The gradations of that deference are
irrelevant here.
53. Pepin, 110 Wis. 2d at 436, 328 N.W.2d at 900.
54. Davis, supra note 21, at § 30.02, at 197.
55. SWIFT, ON POETRY. A RHAPSODY (1733).
56. See, eg., Pepin, 110 Wis. 2d at 435-36, 328 N.W.2d at 900.
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This deference embraces the trial court's determinations, tacit or overt, on
credibility. "It is generally held that whether made by [a] jury, judge, or
agency a determination of credibility is nonreviewable unless there is un-
controvertible documentary evidence or physical fact which contradicts
it."57 According deference further recognizes the trial court's opportunity
to evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses.58 There can be little question
that appellate courts are "ill-suited to consider the variables that go into
fact-finding." 59 The deference accorded to the trial court's presence at the
reception of testimony extends to reasonable inferences drawn from the
credible evidence.' The trial court has a "superior opportunity to get 'the
feel of the case.' ,61 The deference may be seen rooted in whatever those
intangibles are that elude print6' (notably the print of the record on appeal)
and that make up the "climate" of the trial.63
"Better position" may also account for a notable exception to the princi-
ple that appellate courts do not defer to lower tribunals on questions of law.
Where an administrative agency has significant expertise in applying a stat-
utory concept to a concrete fact situation, the court reviewing that decision
should give weight to the agency's value judgment."4 Here, the initial tribu-
nal's better position is not based upon its witnessing some particular liti-
gant, witness, or trial. Rather, deference is paid to expertise developed
through an agency's experience in implementing the statute.65 Hence, an
administrative agency may be put in a better position than an appellate
court by virtue of the agency's repeated administering of a statute.
Thus, better position appears to encompass two different meanings of
the word "experience." First, a trial tribunal's better position depends
upon its having experienced or "sensed" the trial itself. Second, its better
position may depend upon its prior experience, endowing it with superior
practical knowledge.
57. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1020, 1031 (1956) (footnote
omitted). But see Davis, supra note 21, at § 29.06, at 145 n.7.
58. See Grutzner v. Kruse, 87 Wis. 2d 38, 42, 273 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Ct. App. 1978).
59. D. WALTHER, supra note 3, at 3-6.
60. Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 87 Wis. 2d 243, 250, 274 N.W.2d 647, 650 (1979).
61. Noonan v. Cunard Steamship Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71 (2nd Cir. 1967).
62. Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at 670.
63. See Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Barrett, 246 F.2d 846, 849 (9th Cir. 1957);
see also Rosenberg, Appellate Review, supra note 8, at 183 (pointedly characterizing that case).
64. See Nigbor v. DILHR, 120 Wis. 2d 375, 383-84, 355 N.W.2d 532, 537 (1984). This
decision is also notable for the court's indirect eschewing of the fact and law labels; it refers to the
question as a "value judgment." Id.
65. For a discussion of this concept, see Drivers Local 695 v. LIRC, 154 Wis. 2d 75, 81-84,
452 N.W.2d 368, 371-72 (1990).
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3. Does Deference Depend on Other Factors As Well?
Other reasons than better position are often propounded to account for
the deference paid by appellate courts to trial courts. Although addressing
the deference paid to discretionary acts, Professor Rosenberg's catalog of
the reasons given for deferring bears addressing here.66 Rosenberg classifies
the first two of these reasons as "bad": judicial economy and morale boost-
ing.67 Whether these reasons are, as Rosenberg suggests, somehow suspect
is, for our purposes, moot. Judicial economy requires an appellate court to
"sign off on a large proportion of the decisions a trial court makes, for
otherwise it would never be able to get its work done."68 True in practice
or not, the rule fails to aid us because, in Rosenberg's words, "it is non-
discriminating. It could apply to any and every question."69 Morale boost-
ing, no more satisfactory from a functional perspective than is judicial econ-
omy, means that trial judges would become demoralized if all their rulings
were measured by a de novo yardstick. Again, this rule is nondiscriminat-
ing. Closely allied with these reasons are the correlatives of finality, which
bolsters confidence in the judicial process,7" and preservation of lower court
legitimacy.71
Regardless of their accuracy, these principles fall to the wayside in a
functional analysis. They do not espouse deference because of any quality
found in a particular issue. Rather, they are ex post facto, arising from
larger policy concerns; they arise from the general rather than from the
particular.
Rosenberg's two good reasons for deference can assist us here. One he
calls "the 'you are there' reason,"' 72 basically the same as the "better posi-
tion" analysis discussed earlier. The other, which might fairly be called an
infinite variety principle,73 will be discussed at greater length in the context
of discretion.
4. A Recap
We have seen that appellate courts do not defer to lower courts' conclu-
sions of law because the lower courts were in no better position to deter-
66. Rosenberg, Appellate Review, supra note 8, at 181-83; see also Rosenberg, Judicial Discre-
tion, supra, note 8, at 660-65.
67. Rosenberg, Appellate Review, supra note 8, at 181.
68. Rosenberg, Appellate Review, supra note 8, at 181.
69. Rosenberg, Appellate Reivew, supra note 8, at 181.
70. Brennan, supra note 1, at 397.
71. Note, supra note 17, at 185-86.
72. Rosenberg, Appellate Review, supra note 8, at 182.
73. See Rosenberg, Appellate Review, supra note 8, at 181-82.
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mine the questions than were the appellate courts. Conversely, appellate
courts do defer to lower courts' findings of fact because the lower courts, by
virtue of their first-hand viewing of the witnesses and the testimony, were in
a better position than appellate courts to determine questions affected by
weight and credibility concerns.
We then may test a particular issue whose standard of review is un-
known by making several inquiries of it. Was the trial court's determina-
tion dependent upon any of the following: (1) An assessment of the
credibility of any witnesses? (2) A weighing of conflicting testimony? (3) A
weighing of conflicting evidence? and (4) The application of a statute within
the particular expertise of that tribunal? Negative answers to all these ques-
tions suggest that the issue is one to which little deference should be paid -
conventionally, an issue of law. Affirmative answers to any of these ques-
tions suggest that the issue is one to which some deference should be paid
- conventionally, one of fact.
This sort of functional analysis enables us to see the logic of at least
some of the earlier-mentioned apparent anomalies of case law. For exam-
ple, in Boutelle v. Chrislaw,74 the Wisconsin Supreme Court began its dis-
cussion of the merits of the case with the following statement which tacitly
acknowledges a functional or practical approach to questions of law and
fact:
This was a trial to the court. A finding of fact made by a trial judge
will not be set aside upon appeal unless it is contrary to the great
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. However, this
court is not bound by a finding of the trial court which is based upon
undisputed evidence when that finding is essentially a conclusion of
law.75
Here, we can see the functional approach at work. What would seem to
be a finding of fact becomes a conclusion of law not because of the nature of
the question presented (i.e., a definitional approach), but rather because of
the way the question came to the trial court, and the resources available to
it for the resolution of that question. Facts accepted by the trial court as
undisputed require none of those advantages available (when they are avail-
able) to the trial judge: the weighing of testimony, the determination of
credibility, and the sifting and winnowing dependent upon the trial judge's
experiencing of the trial.76 In short, the trial judge is in no better position
74. 34 Wis. 2d 665, 150 N.W.2d 486 (1967).
75. Id. at 672-73, 150 N.W.2d at 490.
76. A trial court would presumably be free to reject even undisputed testimony on credibility
grounds. Cf Thiel v. Damrau, 268 Wis. 76, 85, 66 N.W.2d 747, 752 (1954). Were that to happen,
an appellate court on review ought to defer to that credibility determination.
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to make a finding dependent solely upon such undisputed facts than would
be the appellate court, because nothing is lost in translation from trial to
appeal. Therefore, the question is one of law because the appellate court
can answer it as well as could the trial court. Much the same analysis holds
true for stipulated facts."
D. Mixed Questions of Fact and Law
We come now to a hybrid which a functional approach again aids in
explaining: The mixed question. While the concept of mixed questions of
fact and law can be traced back some two hundred years,7 8 scholars have
not always agreed as to the treatment of such questions. Thayer viewed
them as questions of fact,79 Holmes as questions of law.80 Further, it would
appear that they are near allied to the concept, now somewhat outmoded, of
ultimate facts.8"
But for our purposes, a historical account is less valuable than a practi-
cal one. A mixed question of fact and law is one with both factual (i.e.,
deferential) and legal (iLe., nondeferential) components. The first question
to be answered in a mixed question is "what, in fact actually happened
.... ",82 To the extent that this determination is contingent upon the trial
court's better position, it is deferred to. The second question is "whether
those facts, as a matter of law, have meaning as a particular legal con-
cept."83 No deference is afforded to this trial court determination. Concep-
tually, the "facts" referred to in the second question must be understood as
facts as found by the trial court. Viewed in that light, the mixed question
standard becomes clear from a functional approach: that part of the trial
court's determination which depended upon the trial court's better position
is deferred to. But the application of that part to an objectified standard of
law is an exercise not entirely dependent upon the experience of the trial
77. See, e.g., State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 151, 179 N.W.2d 641, 655 (1970).
78. See K. DAVIS, supra note 21, § 30.01 at 189-90 and cases cited therein.
79. Thayer, supra note 28, at 249-50.
80. 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS at 236 (1920); see also K. DAVIS, supra note 21,
at § 30.02, at 195-96.
81. See Note, supra note 17, at 173-75 and cases cited therein; see also Cointe v. Congregation
of St. John the Baptist, 154 Wis. 405, 418, 143 N.W. 180, 186 (1913).
82. Department of Revenue v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 713, 281 N.W.2d 94, 101 (1979).
83. Id.
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court, and therefore may be done as well by the appellate court.8 4 This
analysis is applicable to both common law, 5 and statutory law. 86
Let us take an example, albeit a loaded one, of an issue to determine
how we arrive at a mixed question functionally. Smith strikes pedestrian
Jones with his automobile; Jones sues Smith for negligence and wins. Smith
appeals, disagreeing with the trial court's determination of negligence. The
issue on appeal is: "Was Smith negligent in striking Jones?" An answer to
this depends upon two antecedent questions: "Just what did Smith do?"
and "Does that conduct correspond to what a reasonable person would
have done?" 87
Concerning the first question, we now inquire whether the trial court
was in a better position to make that initial determination than would be an
appellate court. This, in turn, depends upon how the circumstances of the
accident came out at trial. If the circumstances of the accident were ac-
cepted as undisputed,88 or were stipulated to,8 9 no deference is necessary
because the trial court was in no better position to decide the facts than
would be the appellate court. Therefore, the "findings" concerning the ac-
cident itself would be treated as if they were "conclusions of law;" they
need not be deferred to. If, on the other hand, witnesses gave differing ac-
counts of the accident, the trial court's position in determining weight and
credibility is superior to the appellate court's, and deference ought therefore
to be accorded.' °
Concerning the second question, whether the reasonable person stan-
dard is satisfied, again we inquire about "better position." Here, regardless
of their source, the facts establishing Smith's conduct are facts as found; the
application of those found facts to a legal standard, here the reasonable
84. The mixed question standard, when viewed from the perspective of function, implies a
characteristic of the judging process that is equally capable of applying a trial court's findings of
fact to a legal standard. It follows that the findings of fact must be assumed to be a complete and
perfect rendering of all that the trial court experienced at the trial; how else can we say that the
trial court's position, in deciding the question of law, is not superior to the appellate court's? The
accuracy of the assumption that the findings of fact inform the appellate court to the same degree
that the experience of the trial informed the trial court is open to some question, but is beyond the
scope of this essay.
85. See, e.g., Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 732, 275 N.W.2d 660,
665 (1979).
86. See, e.g., Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 125 Wis. 2d 437,444, 272 N.W.2d 680,
684 (Ct. App. 1985).
87. Cf Millonig v. Bakken, 112 Wis. 2d 445, 450, 334 N.W.2d 80, 83 (1983).
88. See Boutelle v. Chrislaw, 34 Wis. 2d 665, 672-73, 150 N.W.2d 486, 490 (1967).
89. See State v. J.C. Penney, 48 Wis. 2d 125, 151, 179 N.W.2d 441, 655 (1970).
90. See Cogswell v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 87 Wis. 2d 243, 249-50, 247 N.W.2d 647, 650
(1979).
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person standard, is not dependent upon better position. Hence, an appellate
court owes it no deference, and we label it a question of law.91
IV. DISCRETION: A TERTIUM QUID?
Of the appellate triumvirate of fact, law, and discretion, the last is easily
the most neglected and the most nebulous. 92 While concepts of fact and
law can be grasped intuitively, although imperfectly, the concept of discre-
tion does not provide us with as convenient a handle. Before we attempt to
determine some characteristics, or at least signposts, of discretionary acts,
let us first examine how discretionary acts are reviewed.
A. Appellate Court Treatment of Discretionary Acts
Leaving aside for the moment the question of what discretionary acts
are, let us examine how they are treated on appeal in Wisconsin. A discre-
tionary determination will be upheld on appeal if it is a reasonable conclu-
sion, based upon a consideration of the appropriate law and facts of
record. 93 Discretion is not synonymous with decision making, but rather
contemplates a process of reasoning from facts of record and reasonable
inferences from them.94 While the basis for an exercise of discretion should
be set forth in the record, 95 it will be upheld if the appellate court can find
facts of record which would support the trial judge's decision.96
An appellate court will not uphold a trial court's discretionary determi-
nation if the trial court abuses or misuses its discretion. This occurs if the
discretionary determination relies upon an erroneous view of the law, a mis-
application of the law, 97 or it is based on irrelevant factors,98 impermissible
factors,99 or a mistaken view of the evidence."m
Considering that a discretionary determination is a conclusion having
both factual and legal components, 01 the most obvious question is what
91. See Nottelson v. ILHR Dep't, 94 Wis. 2d 106, 115-16, 287 N.W.2d 763, 768 (1980).
92. See Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 635-36.
93. Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16, 20-21 (1981).
94. See McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512, 519 (1971).
95. State v. Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d 754, 764, 159 N.W.2d 733, 738 (1968).
96. Maier Constr., Inc. v. Ryan, 81 Wis. 2d 463, 473, 260 N.W.2d 700, 704 (1978) (citations
omitted).
97. Id. See also Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d at 763, 159 N.W.2d at 737.
98. Carlson Heating, Inc. v. Onchuck, 104 Wis. 2d 175, 181, 311 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Ct. App.
1981).
99. Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 554, 238 N.W.2d 479, 482 (1984) (citations omitted).
100. Krolikowski v. Chicago and N.W. Transp. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 573, 581, 278 N.W.2d 865,
868 (1979) (citations omitted).
101. See Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d at 66, 306 N.W.2d at 20-21.
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distinguishes a discretionary determination from a mixed question of fact
and law? To determine this, we must first examine the characteristics of the
discretionary determination.
B. Hallmarks of Discretion
Professor Rosenberg identifies the basic idea of discretion as
"choice." 10 2 However, choice is too protean a concept in law to have much
utility. Trial judges choose between conflicting versions of the factors in
determining a finding of fact. They choose between conflicting arguments
in arriving at statutory interpretation, a question of law, 10 3 and they choose
among a variety of possible punishments in meting out sentences, a discre-
tionary determination. 1°4
Thus, choice must be defined more particularly. One commentator
characterizes that choice as involving not right or wrong, but "better or
worse." 10 5 This approach is consonant with the statement cited by Rosen-
berg that defines a discretionary question as one with "no fixed principles
by which its correctness may be determined." 106
Perhaps now we may catch a glimmer of the distinction between mixed
questions and discretionary ones. In a mixed question, the usual formula-
tion describing the nexus between fact and law is that "whether the facts
fulfill aparticular legal standard is itself a question of law."" °7 Stated func-
tionally, an appellate court is as capable of applying the law to the facts as
was the trial court. The legal component of a discretionary determination,
however, would seem to be different from that in a question of law. In
discretionary matters, presumably, an appellate court defers because it
would be disadvantaged in attempting to apply the standard de novo, or to
reproduce circumstances under which the trial court applied it initially.
An examination of at least some types of discretionary legal standards
bears out this assumption. Some discretionary legal standards or require-
ments are sufficiently broad or open-ended so that their application is not
102. Rosenberg, Appellate Review, supra note 8, at 175.
103. E.g., Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. ILHR Dep't., 90 Wis. 2d 408, 417, 280 N.W.2d 142, 146-47
(1979).
104. E.g., McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512, 517-18 (1971).
105. Isaacs, supra note 17, at 8.
106. Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion, supra note 8, at 638 (quoting Palliser v. Home Tel. Co.,
170 Ala. 341, 345, 54 So. 499, 500 (1911)); see also Asbeck v. Asbeck, 116 Wis. 2d 289, 294, 342
N.W.2d 750, 753 (Ct. App. 1983).
107. Department of Revenue v. Exxon Corp., 90 Wis. 2d 700, 713, 281 N.W.2d 94, 101
(1979) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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susceptible of one "correct" answer; others consist of many parts whose
application necessitates a weighing of factors or considerations.
Of the first, or "open-ended," type of discretionary legal standard,
which we might call a "no wrong answer" standard, we might take as a
good example the Wisconsin discretionary change of venue statute. Section
801.52 of the Wisconsin Statutes, reads: "The court may at any time, upon
its own motion, the motion of a party or the stipulation of the parties,
change the venue to any county in the interest of justce or for the conven-
ience of the parties or witnesses."10 s Here, the legal standard component is
a fine example of a question guided by no fixed principle; "in the interest of
justice or for the convenience of the parties or witnesses" are scarcely stan-
dards at all, if we view standards as rules against which things (here, the
facts) are measured. In any event, it may fairly be said that decisions which
are based upon standards as nebulous as the interest of justice or the con-
venience of parties or witnesses result in better or worse answers, rather
than "right or wrong" ones.
Of the second or multifarious type of discretionary legal standard,
which we might call a "factor" standard, let us look at criminal sentencing.
Three primary factors have been identified as crucial in the discretionary
act of sentencing: "the gravity of the offense, the character of the offender,
and the need for protection of the public."" A substantial number of con-
stituent factors, which gloss the three primary factors, have been deemed
relevant. They include:
The defendant's personality, character and social traits, the results
of a presentence investigation, the vicious or aggravated nature of
the crime, the degree of defendant's culpability, the defendant's de-
meanor at trial, the defendant's age, educational background and
employment record, cooperativeness, the defendant's need for close
rehabilitative control, and the rights of the public."'o
It should be clear that the application of the facts (which, it should be
remembered, may not yet have been rendered as findings in any memoran-
dum decision, but rather are to be "found" only as the underpinnings for
the discretionary sentencing decision) to the relevant sentencing factors is
an exercise particularly dependent upon value judgments, evaluation, and
weighing. Again, like the "no wrong answer" standard, with a "factor"
standard the trial judge labors in the realm of better or worse, rather than
right or wrong.
108. Wis. STAT. § 801.52 (1989-90).
109. Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 284, 286 N.W.2d 559, 561 (1981) (citations omitted).
110. State v. Killory, 73 Wis. 2d 400, 408, 242 N.W.2d 475, 481 (1976) (citing State v. Tew,
54 Wis. 2d 361, 367-68, 195 N.W.2d 615, 619 (1972)).
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Both "no wrong answer" and "factor" standards found in discretionary
acts are characterized by Professor Rosenberg's cynosure of discretion as
choice."'1 The "choice" which characterizes discretion is a choice depen-
dent upon weighing or balancing facts, factors, or a combination of both. 12
The weighed or balanced choice principle would appear to account for
the deference paid in denominating, as discretionary, sentencing,113 eq-
uity,1 14 and custody."' In sentencing, a nearly infinite range of options is
available to the trial court. In equity, the remedies are, again, wide ranging.
Finally, in custody, while the number of possible options are frequently
small, the underlying factual considerations are manifold and the statutory
factors are substantial.1 16
A different facet of discretion is its association with matters of proce-
dure. As Professor Rosenberg stated: "[I]n matters governed by proce-
dural rules, discretion is very often at large."117 But, as is so often the case
with legal terms, "procedure" itself needs a bit of a gloss here to become
useful. Procedure here should be seen as what is required to get and keep
the trial process (e.g., calendaring, pretrial activity, motion practice, the
trial itself, etc.) moving. Again, these are examples of "no fixed principle"
standards.11" In discretionary matters, deference is paid to the trial judge
not only in his or her role as auditor/viewer, but as presider as well, re-
specting circumstances "where not only would it be difficult to prescribe
exact and minute regulations, but where the situation itself is not easily
reproduced in its original character ..- .""I "One of the powers which has
always been recognized as inherent in courts... has been the right to con-
trol its order of business .. ".."120 Hence, the following procedure-oriented
determinations, all central to keeping the trial process moving, are deemed
discretionary: enlargement of time to file an answer121 or complaint, 122
111. See Rosenberg, Appellate Review, supra note 8, at 175.
112. See Mulder v. Mittelstadt, 120 Wis. 2d 103, 115, 352 N.W.2d 223, 228 (Ct. App. 1984).
113. See McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512, 517-18 (1971).
114. See Mulder, 120 Wis. 2d at 115, 352 N.W.2d at 228-29.
115. See Belisle v. Belisle, 27 Wis. 2d 317, 321-22, 134 N.W.2d 491, 494 (1965).
116. See Wis. STAT. § 767.24(2)(a)-(f) (1989-90).
117. Rosenberg, Appellate Review, supra note 8, at 173; see also Rosenberg, Judicial Discre-
tion, supra note 8, at 653.
118. See sources cited supra note 106.
119. T. LEE & B. OVERTON, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 3 (1974).
120. Id. at 23 (quoting Thurmond v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 836, 839, 427 P.2d 985, 986-
87, 59 Cal. Rptr. 273, 274-75, (1967)).
121. Hedtcke v. Sentry Ins. Co, 109 Wis. 2d 461, 467-68, 326 N.W.2d 727, 730-31 (1982).
122. Stryker v. Town of La Pointe, 52 Wis. 2d 228, 231-32, 190 N.W.2d 178, 180 (1971).
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amendment of pleadings,12 discovery matters,124 dismissals for delay, 12 5
change of venue, 12 6 motions for mistrial,127 rulings on admissibility of evi-
dence, 128 competency of expert witnesses, 129 arguments of counsel,130 and
motions for a new trial.131 In fact, it has been broadly stated that "[t]he
conduct of a trial is subject to the exercise of sound judicial discretion by
the trial court .... ,132
We can understand the broad grant of deference to trial courts in these
discretionary matters from a number of perspectives. First, the legal stan-
dards applicable to the above discretionary acts are largely weighed or bal-
anced choices characteristic of discretion generally. Second, the role of the
trial judge as presider, maestro, director, overseer, monitor, helmsman, and
ringmaster surely underlies some of the deference paid. The difficult task of
making quick decisions in the heat of the trial should be, and is, respected.
"[Trial judges] are under the disadvantage of often having to make rulings
off the cuff, so to speak, in the press and urgency of a trial proceeding
"133
Finally, and certainly not least, some of the deference accorded to dis-
cretionary acts again goes back to the "better position" principle.1 34 The
extent to which this is true may be seen in the Pepin13  case referred to
earlier. There, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied the "better posi-
tion" analysis 136 to the question of the admissibility of hearsay evidence, a
discretionary question. 137 The appellate court concluded that, because the
evidence to be admitted was documentary, and no demeanor evidence at-
123. Leciejewski v. Sedlak, 116 Wis. 2d 629, 643, 342 N.W.2d 734, 741 (1984).
124. Shibilski v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 83 Wis. 2d 459, 470-71, 266, N.W.2d 264, 270 (1978).
125. Lawrence v. MacIntyre v. Frank, 48 Wis. 2d 550, 554, 180 N.W.2d 538, 540 (1970).
126. Wis. STAT. § 801.52 (1989-90); Central Auto Co. v. Reichert, 87 Wis. 2d 9, 15, 273
N.W.2d 360, 363 (Ct. App. 1978).
127. Valiga v. National Food Co., 58 Wis. 2d 232, 253-54, 206 N.W.2d 377, 389 (1973).
128. Chomicki v. Wittekind, 128 Wis. 2d 188, 195, 381 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Ct. App. 1985).
129. Simpsen v. Madison General Hosp., 48 Wis. 2d 498, 509, 180 N.W.2d 586, 592 (1970).
130. Herro v. DNR, 67 Wis. 2d 407, 434, 227 N.W.2d 456, 472 (1975).
131. After Hour Welding, Inc. v. Laneil Management Co., 108 Wis. 2d 734, 740, 324 N.W.2d
686, 690 (1982).
132. Valiga, 58 Wis. 2d at 253, 206 N.W.2d at 389.
133. Magruder, The Trials and Tribulations of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 44 CORNELL
L. Q. 1, 3 (1958).
134. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
135. State v. Pepin, 110 Wis. 2d 431, 328 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1982).
136. Id. at 435-36, 328 N.W.2d at 900.
137. See State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d 425, 450, 247 N.W.2d 80, 93 (1976); see also State v.
Buelow, 122 Wis. 2d 465, 476, 363 N.W.2d 255, 261 (Ct. App. 1984).
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tended it, the trial court was in no better position to determine trustworthi-
ness that was then appellate court.1"'
V. CONCLUSION
The labels "question of fact," "question of law," and "discretionary
act," have outlived their usefulness in appellate law. While these labels may
well be too solidly ensconced in judicial opinions for anyone to expect that
lawyers or judges would easily or readily abandon them, we must recognize
that these labels no longer invariably indicate how much an appellate court
will defer to a determination made by a lower court or administrative body.
Rather, as we have seen, an appellate court defers to a determination made
below when it has reason to believe that the lower tribunal was, for
whatever reason, in a better position to make that particular determination.
If, in its review, an appellate court cannot duplicate the conditions present
when the lower tribunal initially determined the question at issue, the ap-
pellate court should defer, at least to the extent to which the initial determi-
nation is unique or irreproducible. What can create an irreproducible
decision? There are undoubtedly a variety of causes.
An appellate court cannot reproduce the decision making process if the
initial decision was at all dependent upon the decision maker's sensory ex-
perience of the hearing or trial. Determinations involving credibility, de-
meanor of witnesses, or the weight to be given their testimony are justifiably
deferred to.
An appellate court cannot reproduce the decision making process if the
initial decision maker possessed some special expertise; courts will defer to
an administrative agency charged with administering a particular body of
statutes where the agency's experience, technical competence, or specialized
knowledge aid it in its interpretation or application of a statute.
An appellate court cannot reproduce the decision making process if the
initial decision making involved indefinite factors or an indefinite number of
factors or options; appellate courts defer to criminal sentencing not only
because the sentencing court could have imposed a nearly infinite variety of
licit sentences, but also because the sentencing court could have considered,
balanced, or even rejected altogether a nearly infinite number of licit
factors.
If appellate courts more frequently gave their reasons for deferring or
not deferring to determinations made by lower tribunals, appellate lawyers
138. Pepin, 110 Wis. 2d at 439, 328 N.W.2d at 901-02.
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could more accurately predict how their issues were likely to be treated on
appeal.
A movement in this direction may be found in the cases of Nigbor v.
DILHR139 and Esparza v. DILHR.14 In Nigbor, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court commented on the fact/law identification problem in administrative
agency value judgments, acknowledged agency expertise and stated that it
would defer to them "if they are found to be reasonable." '4 1 Similarly, in
Esparza, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, citing Nigbor, followed this lead,
and noted that "[a]lthough the supreme court in Nigbor did not expressly
abandon the 'fact/law' approach for purposes of judicial review, it obvi-
ously chose not to apply it." 42 Each court avoided the old labels in favor
of discussing deference directly.
The law loses nothing by ignoring or abandoning the old labels, as long
as appellate courts give reasons for according or not according deference to
particular lower tribunal determinations. The law gains clarity, however,
because the old labels currently tell us only indirectly about the deference
accorded. A direct approach, where appellate courts simply indicate how
much they defer and why, would simplify a framework now needlessly
convoluted.
139. Nigbor v. DILHR, 120 Wis. 2d 375, 355 N.W.2d 532 (1984).
140. Esparza v. DILHR, 132 Wis. 2d 401, 393 N.W.2d 98 (Ct. App. 1986).
141. Nigbor, 120 Wis. 2d at 383-84, 355 N.W.2d at 537.
142. Espara, 132 Wis. 2d at 406, 393 N.W.2d at 100.
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